Many developing country governments rely heavily on trade tax revenue. Therefore, trade liberalization can be a potential source of significant fiscal instability, and may affect government spending on development activities. Donor nations may take this into account in making their aid allocation decisions for developing nations. Our findings suggest that bilateral donors provide substantially larger amounts of aid to compensate (or reward) liberalizing recipient nations who also face declining trade tax revenues. Interestingly, these effects are statistically insignificant in the context of multilateral aid. Multilateral donors are more focused on income per capita and may be using it as a de facto measure of average living standards in the recipient nations.
Introduction
After successive Uruguay Round negotiations and the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the early 1990s, many developing countries have chosen to dismantle their trade barriers and open their economies to international competition. Though trade theory advocates greater economic gains from trade liberalization, the transition to free trade may involve a substantial adjustment cost in terms of decline in revenues. Since developing countries often rely heavily on trade tax revenue, a reduction or elimination of these taxes may be a source of their fiscal instability. To the extent that public spending is targeted at useful programs like schools, infrastructure, health etc. this may be a significant loss for a poor nation. In the long run, if liberalization is successful, one would expect these problems to be addressed both by provision of better private markets, as well as from rising revenues from different sources (income tax, sales tax, or maybe even trade taxes due to the volume effect) due to rising income levels. However, even in the case of potentially successful liberalization, the donors may be concerned about the short run budgetary implications of trade liberalization for the poorest of nations.
In principle, even in the short run, revenue losses from trade liberalization may be offset by turning to alternative sources of revenue that may be less distortionary. This requires good governance and an efficient domestic tax system. The evidence on this is not very heartening.
For example, Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) argue that middle and low income countries fail to carry out substantial tax reforms to replace lost trade revenue by revenue from other sources.
They find that middle income countries recovered 45-60 cents from other sources for every one dollar loss in trade tax revenue, while low income countries could recover no more than 30 cents for each lost dollar. Khattry and Rao (2002) find that in low-income countries revenue constraints remain even after a decade of trade reforms, and emphasize fiscally realistic development strategy in the post-liberalization period. In a broader analysis on limitation of trade policy reform in developing countries, Rodrik (1992) argues that tariff reduction at the cost of fiscal considerations can have disastrous consequences. He cites examples of Turkey and Morocco, where trade taxes were re-imposed due to fiscal problems.
There is a realization among developed nations that trade-related technical and financial assistance should be extended to mitigate detrimental effects of trade reforms in developing countries. The official development assistance (ODA), commonly known as foreign aid, may be used to compensate countries experiencing declining trade revenue. It may also be offered as a reward for pursuing trade liberalization policies. Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997) base their analysis along the latter rationale for aid allocation. They present a model where recipient nations compete to give tariff concessions to donors to get a bigger pie of the foreign aid.
In spite of the sizeable literature in this broad area of trade and aid, empirical analysis of the impact of declining trade revenue on foreign aid allocation is sparse. Most studies focus on the political and strategic interests of donors, while others analyze their developmental and humanitarian concerns, while some investigate both.
1 Recent studies have explored other aspects of donors' aid allocation such as colonial ties of aid recipient countries, support to donor countries in U.N. voting and the level of corruption in the recipient nations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Alesina and Weder, 2002 ; Burnside and Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) . Concerning selectivity of aid allocation, Dollar and Levin (2004) show that more aid has been allocated to poor countries with reasonably good institutions, however, this pattern is somewhat different between bilateral and 1 See for example, Little (1977 and 1979) , Maizels and Nissanke (1984) , Dowling and Hiemenz (1985) , Trumbull and Wall (1994) , Wall (1995) , Neumayer (2003a Neumayer ( , 2003b and Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) . multilateral donors. This paper complements the literature by empirically investigating the effect of declining trade revenue (due to liberalization) on the aid allocation decision.
The logic of compensating trade liberalizing developing nations is consistent with the foreign aid objectives for reducing poverty and promoting economic development, captured in the DAC guidelines for poverty reduction.
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Moreover, bilateral donors are driven by the motivation for pursuing their own economic interests in their potential export markets (see Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Neumayer, 2003a The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section illustrates empirical methodology. Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents estimation results and section 5 concludes.
Empirical Methodology
In order to derive consistent and efficient estimates, we control for commonly examined variables in the aid allocation literature (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) . This approach helps in identifying the similarities and differences in policy objectives of bilateral and multilateral donors.
Three goals guide our sample selection. First, we include only middle and low income aid recipient countries because past studies conclude that they face highest uncompensated loss in trade revenue (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Khattry and Rao, 2002; Rodrik, 1992) . 3 Second, since Israel and Egypt receive disproportionately higher amount of aid largely based on political reasons, we exclude them to focus on the economic determinants. Third, since containment of communism rather than development concerns was a major factor for providing aid during the Cold War era (see Boschini and Olofsgård, 2005) , we limit our analysis to the Post Cold War period. Another constraint was the non-availability of consistent yearly data for majority of developing countries on revenues from international trade taxes prior to the 1990s. This factor also restricts our analysis to the Post Cold War period. Finally, only the recipient countries who received positive amount of aid for each time period in our sample are included.
Regarding the choice of the model that fits the data well, we prefer using the pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) over the fixed effects (FE) model. The main appeal for using POLS model is that the coefficients of recipient-specific and time-invariant variables such as colonial ties and geographical proximity can also be estimated which is not possible with the FE 4 The instrumental variables (IV) approach is not common in this literature. Most studies use OLS. 5 Maizels and Nissanke (1984) , while citing Maddala (1977) , state that, "all estimation techniques, including 2SLS, are designed to deal only with the contemporaneous simultaneity and the lagged endogenous (dependent) variables are treated in simultaneous models as predetermined variables along with other exogenous variables in the system." Therefore, if aid flows can be assumed to affect a country's economic performance with some time lag, the problem of simultaneous bias is considerably lessened and the necessity of using 2SLS instead of OLS is accordingly greatly diminished.
Moreover, we account for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation in our estimation method.
The empirical model takes the following form: Past studies find a bias in aid allocation against countries with larger populations (Isenman, 1976; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . The literature offers the following explanations that consider both supply side 6 The Ttaxr and Idr variables are not included together in the regression because of very high inter-correlation between them. Import duties make up more than 90 percent of total international tax revenue for a majority of the countries in our sample. Therefore it is reasonable not to introduce these as separate right hand side variables.
and demand side factors: (1) the marginal impact of aid decreases as population increases; (2) high population countries lack administrative expertise to absorb large amounts of aid; and, (3) it is easier for donors to wield political influence over smaller countries than larger ones.
Per capita income alone may not be an adequate reflection of economic needs for aid, especially in view of high income inequalities in several recipient countries. This prompted our use of the infant mortality rate, which relates to the concept of individual well-being. This is also in the tradition of the existing literature in this area (see Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995 etc.) . 7 The political rights and civil liberties variable used as a proxy for human rights captures the donor's perception about the objective function of the recipient government. If a recipient (government) values human rights, it is perceived to put a higher weight on the welfare of its people. In turn, it is likely that it will utilize the aid to improve their well-being.
Higher trade openness and lower import barriers by recipient countries directly benefit donor countries by expanding markets for their exports. Trade expansion can be deemed as an outcome of trade liberalization policies including lower import duties and quotas, reducing export taxes and credits, etc. Therefore, we can expect a positive relationship between trade openness and aid per capita.
Bilateral and multilateral donors may allocate more aid to recipient countries experiencing uncompensated loss from trade tax revenue to support public programs that target the poor. In addition, there is a fear that declining trade revenues may lead to tighter fiscal policy which in turn may topple the regime that is engaging in liberalization. This may stop or even reverse the process of trade liberalization. To avoid such political instability, the donors may provide more aid. Finally, we may expect to see a negative relation between trade revenue and aid if donors reward the recipients for engaging in liberalization. Although observationally equivalent, the latter motive of "reward" is in principle distinct from the "compensation" motive.
Following the literature in this area (for example, Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a) , we examine whether a recipient country's experience as a colony of a DAC country or its geographical location have an influence on aid allocation by bilateral and multilateral donors.
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Information about a recipient country's colonial history is taken from the CIA Factbook (2006).
We use a dummy variable that assumes the value of one if a recipient country had been a colony of any of the donors in our study, it is zero otherwise. The geographical location variable tests whether recipient countries closer to the United States, Western Europe, or Japan receive more aid than others. 9 We expect that both colonial experience and geographical location have a positive influence on bilateral aid allocation. Since USA, Japan, Germany and France are major shareholders in multilateral aid agencies, they may wield their influence over policies of these organizations (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006) . In this case, we may also find a positive relation between multilateral aid per capita and these two political-strategic variables.
Although there is high correlation between income per capita and infant mortality rate, past studies routinely include both of them in the same regression as they provide significantly different information to donors.
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While income per capita indicates the average level of prosperity and economic development, infant mortality rate may capture quality of life issues 8 One advantage of using pooled OLS is that, unlike the fixed effects model, the coefficients of the colonial and distance variables, which are time-invariant, can be estimated, as discussed above. 9 Geographical proximity is measured as the minimum air distance, in kilometers, of a recipient country from New York, Rotterdam, and Tokyo. Its data was taken from Gallup, Sachs and Mellinger (1999) . Following Neumayer (2003a), we used existing data for a geographically close country (neighboring), if distance data for a particular country is not available. 10 Per capita income captures economic need while infant mortality signifies physical need (Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995; Bandyopadhyay and Wall, 2007) . Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2007) note that though economic and physical needs are clearly correlated in the long run, they do not necessarily move in the same direction over shorter periods of time.
that income alone cannot account for (for example, a poor person may have access to publicly provided medical care, which may reduce infant mortality and raise the quality of life).
Therefore, we include both variables together in all regressions. 11 In addition, equation (1) also includes a time dummy 1 − t η that accounts for time-specific changes in trade policy of recipient nations.
12 In addition it also controls for events like a flood or a drought in a particular yearwhich may lead to an aid spike for the corresponding year.
Description of Data
The data for aggregate net aid by bilateral donors and multilateral agencies to fifty two recipient countries for the period 1992-2003 is taken from International Development Statistics (2005) . 13 It contains aid given for development purposes only and does not include grants, loans, and credits for military purposes.
Following Neumayer (2003a), we converted aid data into constant US$2000 using the unit value of the world import price index, and used the recipient nations' population to express the aid data in real per capita terms. This serves to express per capita aid in terms of its purchasing power for a representative bundle of imports.
14 Moreover, such a dependent variable also controls for a recipient country's size effect.
11 The correlations among majority of the independent variables are not very high with the exception of that between real income per capita and the infant mortality rate. To check whether multicollinearity poses a problem, eigenvalues for correlations among explanatory variables were tested and found to be low. 12 Inclusion of time specific dummy variables allow each time period to have its own intercept for aggregate time effects affecting all countries. Also, one time specific dummy must be dropped in order to avoid perfect collinearity. 13 Specification-(1) uses one year lagged value for all independent variables. Therefore their data are for the period 1991-2002 (see section 2 for a detailed discussion). Bilateral aid is from twenty two DAC member countries of OECD who are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of America. The multilateral aid is given by the World Bank, the IMF and the UN including their regional branches. 14 The estimation results using GDP deflator at constant US$2000 for converting aid into real term are similar. House (2006) . Political rights refer to the freedom of people to participate in the political process by exercising their voting right, being able to organize political parties to compete for public office, and forming an effective opposition and electing representatives who devise public policies and are accountable for their actions. Civil liberties entail freedom of expression and religious belief, the prevalence of rule of law, right to form unions, freedom to marry, and freedom to travel. It also signifies the autonomy of people without interference from the state. These two indicators are derived from a cross country survey every year. Each of these indices is measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) points scale.
Following Trumbull and Wall (1994) , Wall (1995) and Neumayer (2003a) , we have constructed a combined freedom index by adding indices of political rights and civil liberties and then reverting that index, such that it ranges from 2 (worst) to 14 (best). 
Estimation Results

Findings with yearly data
Estimation results for the full sample, including both middle and low income recipient countries, are shown in table 3. For bilateral aid allocation (columns 1 and 2), the sign and significance of the estimated coefficients on population size, income per capita, infant mortality and political/civil rights variables coincide with past findings (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; Dowling and Hiemenz, 1985; Trumbull and Wall, 1994; Wall, 1995; Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a Neumayer, , 2003b Neumayer, , 2003c The estimated coefficient on trade openness is positive and significant at 5 percent level.
This suggests that donors use aid to achieve dual objectives. First, they encourage recipients to expand international trade by reducing trade barriers. Second, they may also try to promote their exports to recipient countries, and thus increase their own benefits through aid (Dudley and Montmarquette, 1976; Neumayer, 2003a) . The estimated coefficient on revenue from international trade tax is negative and significant at 1 percent level. Its magnitude suggests that a 1 percent decrease in trade revenue has an impact of 1.2 percent increase in bilateral aid per capita. 16 This could reflect compensation (for falling tax revenues) or reward (for liberalization) or both.
The coefficient on the distance variable is negative and significant, while the coefficient on colonial dummy variables is positive and significant. These suggest that both political and strategic considerations of bilateral donors, as proxied by their geographical proximity and colonial ties, result in supplying more aid (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Neumayer, 2003a) .
Column 2 includes import duty revenue and drops international trade tax revenue. They are not included together in the regression due to their high inter-correlation. The estimated coefficient on revenues from import duties is negative and significant at 1 percent level. The size 16 Since dependent variable is in logged form while international trade tax is not, we multiply its estimated coefficient by 100 to derive its actual magnitude and therefore impact on bilateral aid per capita.
of its coefficient is also about the same as of international trade tax revenue in column 1. The results for all other variables including trade openness also remain about the same as in column 1. For developing nations, these findings are positive. They gain from efficiency increases from freer trade and the possible adverse revenue consequences for their governments are largely compensated by aid inflows.
Columns 3 and 4 outline the results for multilateral aid. Similar to the bilateral case, the estimated coefficients on both population and income per capita are significant and negative.
The coefficient on the infant mortality rate is positive but significant at only 10 percent level, and its magnitude is also relatively small, suggesting that multilateral donors focus less on alleviating infant mortality. A positive and significant coefficient on political/civil rights variable suggests that multilateral donors also reward recipient countries valuing greater respect for human rights. The variables measuring the effect of political and strategic considerations, i.e., colonial link and geographical proximity, also have significant and positive impact on multilateral aid. It may be noted that the significance of these factors has been confirmed in previous studies (Neumayer, 2003b) in the contexts of both bilateral and multilateral aid.
Column 4 includes revenue from import duties and drops the international trade tax revenue variable. Like international trade tax revenue, the coefficient on import duties is also insignificant, suggesting that multilateral agencies are not directly concerned about declining tax revenues due to recipient liberalization. The coefficient on trade openness has a negative sign and is significant at only the 10 percent level. Infant mortality rate is not significant. Income per capita has a large and significant effect on multilateral aid allocation. Other findings are similar to the trade tax revenue case discussed above.
To further examine how sensitive the donors are to economic conditions in developing countries, we reduce our sample by including only low income aid recipient countries. Table 4 shows results for thirty-seven low income aid recipients. The results for bilateral aid are similar to the full sample findings in showing a much better fit of these models compared to the regressions for the full sample case (table 3, columns 1 and 2).
Similarly, results for multilateral aid per capita are shown in columns 3 and 4. The results for reduced sample size involving only low income countries remain about the same as for the full sample case. As before, the effects of trade openness and of revenues (international trade tax and import duties) are insignificant. On the other hand, the size and significance of the coefficient on income per capita has increased, while the impact of the infant mortality rate turns out to be insignificant. The results suggest that multilateral donors are largely focused on income per capita in the low income nations and use it as a de facto measure of economic development (or underdevelopment).
Three-year data averaging
We also consider three-year data averaging to reduce the effect of unusually high or low levels of aid allocation as donors may lack information about a recipient country in any one year.
The results for both middle and low income countries are presented in table 5. Columns 1 and 2 relate to bilateral aid allocation, while 3 and 4 to the multilateral case. The central results are not qualitatively altered. The effect of infant mortality rate is even larger on bilateral aid, while its effect on multilateral aid is insignificant. On the other hand, the effect of income per capita on bilateral aid is weakly significant with a smaller coefficient size when international trade tax revenue is included. It is insignificant when revenues from import duties are controlled for in the regression. The results for all other variables remain about the same as before. These findings confirm that bilateral donors reward recipient countries promoting trade openness and also compensate for declining trade revenues, while multilateral donors do not show a direct concern in this regard.
Estimation results of a reduced sample involving low income countries are shown in table 6. The result remains about the same except that the effect of the colonial dummy variable on bilateral aid has turned insignificant, while it stays significant for multilateral donors. Since, colonial dummy remained significant for all other regressions, this result is puzzling, and needs more detailed analysis in a separate study.
Conclusion
Though trade liberalization results in greater economic efficiency and growth, it is also a potential source of fiscal instability in developing countries as they rely heavily on revenue from trade taxes. There is a realization among developed nations that trade-related technical and financial assistance should be extended to mitigate detrimental effects of trade reforms in developing countries. This paper empirically examines this issue for the cases of bilateral and multilateral aid allocation. We control for commonly examined variables in this literature to avoid ad hoc econometric treatment and try to derive consistent and efficient estimates.
The estimation results indicate that bilateral donors provide substantially larger amount of aid to recipient countries experiencing decline in revenue from international trade taxes as well as imports duties. Moreover, trade openness by recipient countries also has positive and significant impact on bilateral aid allocation. Interestingly, the impacts of international trade tax revenue and trade openness on multilateral aid are insignificant. These suggest that bilateral donors use aid either to compensate recipient countries for lost trade revenue or to reward them for moving towards free trade regimes. Irrespective of their specific intention, the detrimental effects of trade liberalization are partially offset through inflow of foreign assistance.
Multilateral donors do not directly target these variables and seem to be more focused on income per capita, probably using it as a de facto measure of poverty and economic well-being.
An increase in infant mortality and a higher level of the political rights/civil liberties both increase bilateral aid, showing donor nations' concern about (recipient) health conditions and human rights. Unfortunately, residents of recipient nations with poor human rights records suffer at the hands of their rulers (who deny them basic freedom) and also due to hardship that is imposed on them because of a cut in foreign aid. Finally, the political and strategic biases in aid allocation of bilateral donors are also reflected in the actions of multilateral donors. Perhaps, this
indicates that influential developed nations (who largely fund multilateral aid) may, as a group, have similar strategic and political interests. To come to a definitive conclusion on this issue, we need a separate and focused analysis. ▄ 
